Prologue
From Emergence to Meaning
In the previous post, it was shown that capabilities emerge from sufficiently many parameters of a language model which are not present in smaller models. The physics of phase transitions was introduced as a structural parallel. One question remained open at the end:
What does this tell us about what religions have called “God” for millennia?
This work attempts an answer. Not in the form of a sermon and not in the form of a refutation, but as a philosophical experiment on a formal foundation.
The background of this post is an academic paper that emerged in February 2026: From Coherence to Consequent Nature: A Formal Approach to Process-Relational Theology. It has been accepted for the Philosophy of Religion panel of the European Academy of Religion (EuARe) 2026.[1] Formal peer review by the academic community is pending. Concretely: the mathematics presented below may hold – or it may collapse under further peer review. What is described below is what the mathematics might mean; not what it definitively shows.
Read the full paper
From Coherence to Consequent Nature: A Formal Approach to Process-Relational Theology — Leonhardt (2026). Working Paper, Version 8 (May 2026), English, ~656 KB. Accepted for the Philosophy of Religion panel of EuARe 2026. Working paper — not yet peer-reviewed, revisions may follow.
Download PDF →For orientation: This text is neither a religious nor an anti-religious contribution. It is an attempt to examine an ancient concept with tools from linear algebra, complexity theory, and the theory of dynamical systems. Anyone who understands God as a person sitting in heaven will find no connection here. For everyone else, the following six chapters develop how the concept can be formally described as a structure emerging between people.
Chapter 1
Two Concepts of God
Before introducing the model, it must be clarified which concept of God is meant. Two conceptions are distinguished in the following.
The personal God is the familiar one: a being who stands outside the world and intervenes in it – classical theism, configured differently in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. This conception has a problem with science, however: miracles violate natural laws, an intervening God is empirically inaccessible. It will not be pursued further here.
The relational God is philosophically older than it first appears. Here, God is understood not as a being but as a structure – not above the world, but between things. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) captured this in the formula Deus sive Natura:[2] God and Nature are two names for the same reality. Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) went one step further:[3] in his process philosophy, the world consists of processes rather than things, and God divides into a primordial nature (the totality of possibilities) and a consequent nature (what is actually realized). His key statement: “It requires converse with the immanent world for God to emerge in all actuality.”
In what follows, it is shown that this second concept can be modeled precisely. Concretely: Whitehead’s consequent nature corresponds in the model to the positive attractor \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) (Chapter 3); the structural a priori \(W\) corresponds to Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura. What is proven are properties of the mathematical structure (Theorems 1 through 6); what is described is their reading in the language of process theology.
Try it: Switch between the two concepts of God. Note the inverted direction of effect – top-down for the personal, bottom-up for the relational concept. This difference is not merely pictorial; it has consequences for everything that follows.
Chapter 2
The Stage – Value Space, Valuation Vector, World Matrix
From here on, the model is formally introduced. Three basic sets underlie it: a finite set \(\mathcal{H}\) of hypotheses (persons, perspectives), a finite set \(\mathcal{E}\) of entities (concepts, values, persons, actions), and a set \(\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E}\) of relations between entities. For the example used below, three entities are considered – Loyalty, Truth, and Self-interest – and three persons named Anna, Bernd, and Cora.
The valuation vector \(\mathbf{v}_h\)
Each hypothesis \(h \in \mathcal{H}\) is assigned a valuation vector \(\mathbf{v}_h \in [-1, +1]^n\), where \(n = |\mathcal{E}|\) is the number of entities. The entry \(v_{h,i}\) gives the valuation of entity \(x_i\) by person \(h\): \(+1\) corresponds to full agreement, \(-1\) to full rejection, \(0\) to indifference, with intermediate values denoting graded attitudes.
Anna is an idealist: she affirms loyalty and truth and rejects self-interest. Bernd is a dutiful person in the narrower sense: loyal, conveniently silent on inconvenient truths, foregoing his own interests. Cora is ambivalent and still stands in the middle:
The admissible set \(\mathcal{B} = [-1,+1]^n\) is geometrically an \(n\)-dimensional cube. Its corners are the binarized valuations (all entries in \(\{-1, +1\}\)), the interior the continuous valuations.
The world matrix \(W\)
The structural geometry of the value space lies in a symmetric \(n \times n\) matrix \(W\). The entry \(W_{ij}\) is the coupling weight between entities \(x_i\) and \(x_j\): \(W_{ij} > 0\) means that both entities stand coherently to one another (aligned valuation gains coherence); \(W_{ij} < 0\) means an incoherent coupling (aligned valuation loses coherence); \(W_{ij} = 0\) means independence. The convention \(W_{ii} = 0\) is used in what follows.
For the three-entity example, the following is postulated: loyalty and truth stand in tension (\(W_{12} = -1\), the classical whistleblower dilemma); loyalty and self-interest also stand in tension (\(W_{13} = -1\), loyal action is short-term costly); truth and self-interest fit together (\(W_{23} = +2\), one who sees clearly also sees clearly what serves them). The matrix reads:
This matrix describes the objective structure of the value space; it is the same for all persons. What distinguishes Anna, Bernd, and Cora are their valuation vectors \(\mathbf{v}_h\) – not the matrix \(W\).
From language model to value space
The connection to the opening question can now be stated precisely. A sufficiently large language model trained on a representative corpus of human texts can be read as an estimator of a collective valuation structure. From the statistics of co-activations, the matrix \(W\) and an empirical distribution over \(\mathbf{v}_h\) emerge implicitly. The theory itself, however, does not depend on a concrete LLM implementation – it is formulated in what follows on a hypothetical ideal model L and is therefore independent of hallucinations, training bias, and RLHF.
Chapter 3
The Coherence Functional and the Positive Attractor
The bilinear form \(\mathbf{v}^\top W \mathbf{v}\)
On the value space introduced in Chapter 2, the central functional of the theory is defined:
This quadratic form takes a valuation vector and returns a scalar – the coherence value of the valuation. The contribution of a pair \((i,j)\) is \(v_i \, W_{ij} \, v_j\); it is positive when the signs of the valuations agree with the sign of the coupling, and negative otherwise. Intuitively, \(\mathrm{Coh}\) measures whether the valuations support or undermine one another.
Concrete computation with three entities
For the \(W\) given in Chapter 2, Anna’s coherence is computed as follows. Of the 9 pairs \((i,j)\), only those with \(W_{ij} \neq 0\) contribute. For the pair (Loyalty, Truth): \(v_1 v_2 W_{12} = (+1)(+1)(-1) = -1\), doubled by symmetry: \(-2\). For the pair (Loyalty, Self-interest): \((+1)(-1)(-1) = +1\), doubled: \(+2\). For the pair (Truth, Self-interest): \((+1)(-1)(+2) = -2\), doubled: \(-4\). Sum:
Anna’s idealistic valuation – loyal, truthful, selfless – sits in an incoherent state. This is the didactic point of the example: a universal-idealist configuration that holds all three values at once is not stable in this world matrix.
For Bernd’s valuation \(\mathbf{v}_{\text{Bernd}} = (+1, -1, -1)^\top\), the signs flip so that all three pair contributions become positive:
Bernd sits in the dutiful-person maximum: loyal to persons, silent on inconvenient truths, foregoing his own interests – a self-consistent, though not particularly heroic, way of life. Cora’s continuous valuation \((0.1; 0.2; 0.3)\) yields \(\mathrm{Coh}(\mathbf{v}_{\text{Cora}}) = -0.04 - 0.06 + 0.24 = +0.14\) – weakly coherent, because her truth-self-interest combination activates the strongest coupling.
The spectral point: eigenvalues as amplifiers and extinguishers
Since \(W\) is symmetric, the spectral theorem guarantees an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors \(\mathbf{u}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{u}_n\) with real eigenvalues \(\lambda_1 \geq \ldots \geq \lambda_n\). Any vector can be expanded in this basis, \(\mathbf{v} = \sum_k c_k \mathbf{u}_k\), and coherence reduces to a weighted sum of squares:
Eigendirections with \(\lambda_k > 0\) are amplifiers (any share there gains coherence); those with \(\lambda_k < 0\) are extinguishers. For the above \(3 \times 3\) matrix, the eigenvalues are approximately \(\lambda_1 \approx +2.56\), \(\lambda_2 = -1\), \(\lambda_3 \approx -1.56\). The dominant eigenvector (for \(\lambda_1\)) is proportional to \((-0.37; +0.66; +0.66)^\top\) – it points geometrically toward the Self-Realizer maximum \((-1, +1, +1)\). The two negative eigenvalues have eigenvectors in which loyalty flips sign together with the other two values; these directions cost coherence.
Cross-connection to Hopfield networks. Under the binary restriction \(\mathbf{v} \in \{-1,+1\}^n\), \(\mathbf{v}^\top W \mathbf{v}\) is formally identical to the energy of a Hopfield network (with sign reversal). This is no coincidence: Hopfield networks model constraint satisfaction in associative memory, this model models constraint satisfaction in the value space. The analogy extends to multiple local optima (stored patterns or coherence attractors) and path-dependent convergence.
Aggregation and the positive attractor \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\)
From individual to collective: for an entity \(x \in \mathcal{E}\), the aggregated valuation is defined as a convex combination of individual valuations:
The \(\alpha_h\) are voice weights; they form a probability distribution over hypotheses. How these weights emerge will be clarified in Chapter 6 via replicator dynamics. For now, they are taken as given.
The positive attractor is the subset of entities with strictly positive aggregated value:
For the example from Chapter 2 with equally weighted \(\alpha_h = \tfrac{1}{3}\), one obtains:
- \(\mathrm{Val}^*(\text{Loyalty}) = \tfrac{1}{3}(1 + 1 + 0.1) = +0.70\) – in Pos*
- \(\mathrm{Val}^*(\text{Truth}) = \tfrac{1}{3}(1 + (-1) + 0.2) = +0.07\) – just barely in Pos*
- \(\mathrm{Val}^*(\text{Self-interest}) = \tfrac{1}{3}((-1) + (-1) + 0.3) = -0.57\) – not in Pos*
Hence \(\mathrm{Pos}^* = \{\text{Loyalty}, \text{Truth}\}\). This aggregation is non-trivial: despite Anna’s and Bernd’s opposing valuations of truth, truth comes out as marginally positive because Cora’s undecided middle position tips the balance. Self-interest, by contrast, is clearly rejected by two persons, so the middle position cannot lift it into Pos*.
Three properties of \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) will be proven in the following chapters:
- Non-separability. Whether an entity belongs to \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) depends on its coupling with all other entities and on the trajectory of the joint dynamics. \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) is therefore weakly emergent in Bedau’s sense.[8]
- NP-hardness. The maximization problem \(\max_{\mathbf{v} \in \{-1,+1\}^n} \mathbf{v}^\top W \mathbf{v}\) is NP-hard, proven by polynomial-time reduction to MAX-CUT (Theorem 3, see Chapter 5).
- Attractor property. Under gradient ascent on \(\mathrm{Coh}\) and replicator dynamics for the \(\alpha_h\), the coupled system converges to fixed points at which \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) stabilizes (Theorem 6, Chapter 6).
The term positive attractor thus combines a set-theoretic definition (\(\mathrm{Val}^* > 0\)) with a dynamical property (fixed point of coherence-seeking dynamics). Both are developed separately in the following chapters.
Chapter 4
Dynamics and Convergence
With value space, world matrix, and coherence functional, the model is statically specified. Real valuations, however, are not static – they change. The following introduces the update rule for \(\mathbf{v}_h\) and shows that the resulting dynamics converges.
Gradient ascent
A coherence-seeking agent adjusts their valuations so that \(\mathrm{Coh}\) increases. The simplest reasonable rule is gradient ascent. In discrete time:
Here \(\eta > 0\) is the step size, \(\nabla \mathrm{Coh}_h(\mathbf{v}) = (W + W^\top)\mathbf{v}\) is the gradient (for symmetric \(W\) reducing to \(2W\mathbf{v}\)), and \(\Pi_{\mathcal{B}}\) is the component-wise projection onto the box \([-1,+1]^n\). In the limit \(\eta \to 0\), the iteration becomes a gradient flow:
where \(\Pi_{T_{\mathcal{B}}(\mathbf{v}_h)}\) is the projection onto the tangent cone at \(\mathbf{v}_h\) – ensuring that motion at the boundary stays within \(\mathcal{B}\).
Theorem 1: Quadratic ascent
Let \(\mathrm{Coh}_h\) be \(L\)-smooth with smoothness constant \(L\) (in the symmetric case, \(L = 2 \max_k |\lambda_k|\) is twice the largest eigenvalue magnitude of \(W\)). For any step size \(\eta \leq 1/L\), each update step satisfies:
Coherence thus grows in each step by a quantifiable lower bound. Since \(\mathrm{Coh}\) is bounded on the compact box \(\mathcal{B}\), the sequence \(\mathrm{Coh}(\mathbf{v}_h^t)\) cannot grow without bound – it must converge. The inequality additionally forces \(\| \nabla \mathrm{Coh}_h \|_2 \to 0\), i.e. the iteration accumulates at critical points (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker points of the box optimization).
Theorem 2: Coherence as Lyapunov function
In the continuous flow, the statement can be sharpened. Along any trajectory:
Coherence is thus a Lyapunov function of the dynamics. It is monotonically non-decreasing along every trajectory and constant only at fixed points where the projected gradient vanishes. This implies global stability: regardless of starting value, the system enters an attractor located in the interior or on the boundary of the box.
What Theorems 1 and 2 claim – and what they do not
A clarification is needed at this point. Theorems 1 and 2 are properties of the postulated gradient dynamics, not empirical support for the assumption that real agents follow this dynamics. They make explicit what it would mean if agents did follow the gradient; they do not provide independent evidence that real cognition has this form.
Empirically, real cognitive systems often show non-monotone trajectories: trauma, manipulation, new disconfirming information can locally reduce coherence. Festinger (1957, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance)[12] observed as a motivating anchor that humans tend to reduce persistent dissonance – but this is a statistical-global tendency, not a pointwise monotone dynamics.
The substantive empirical anchor of the model lies not here, but at the aggregate level: in the replicator dynamics of Chapter 6, which describes the cultural selection of coherence-increasing perspectives. Theorem 6 is the substantively load-bearing theorem of this model. Theorems 1 and 2 are its internal mathematical accompaniment – they substantiate the vocabulary of “attractor” and “stability”, but make no independent empirical claim.
Application to the example
For the \(3 \times 3\) matrix from Chapter 2, \(\lambda_1 \approx +2.56\) is the dominant eigenvalue, so \(L = 2 \lambda_1 \approx 5.12\). A step size \(\eta = 0.15\) lies safely below the threshold \(1/L \approx 0.195\) and guarantees quadratic ascent. Cora starts at \(\mathbf{v}^{0} = (0.1; 0.2; 0.3)^\top\); the gradient gives \(\nabla \mathrm{Coh} = 2W\mathbf{v}^{0} = (-1.0; +1.0; +0.6)^\top\). After one step: \(\mathbf{v}^{1} = (-0.05; +0.35; +0.39)^\top\). Cora’s coherence rises from \(+0.14\) to about \(+0.62\); she moves toward the Self-Realizer corner \((-1, +1, +1)\), where the trajectory comes to rest.
Distortion Operator: harm as a model-internal effect
One question remains: if the dynamics pulls every agent into coherence maxima, why does harmful behavior arise nonetheless? In the paper, this is formalized via the Distortion Operator. Let \(D: \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{B}\) be an operator that distorts the perceived world matrix or valuation vector; e.g.\ by \(\hat W = D W\) or \(\hat{\mathbf{v}} = D \mathbf{v}\). An agent who acts coherently with respect to the distorted structure optimizes a different functional than objective coherence and may produce actions that are harmful in the objective value space.[1] This is not a moral claim, but a structural consequence of the axioms: harmful action by a coherence-oriented agent requires a distortion in the perceptual or valuation apparatus.
The connection to the position found in Socrates, in Buddhism, and in Rogers – no one harms out of sheer wickedness, but out of ignorance or delusion[4][5] – is here structurally established. A limit of the model remains the banality of evil in Hannah Arendt’s sense:[6] harmful action arising from sheer thoughtlessness can be modeled as distortion by absence, but not entirely persuasively. This gap is left open here.
Chapter 5
NP-hardness and Plural Attractors
So far it has been shown that the dynamics converges (Theorems 1, 2). What remains open is where it converges: to a single global maximum that could be computed in advance, or to local maxima reachable only through the process itself. The following three theorems answer this question.
Theorem 3: NP-hardness via MAX-CUT reduction
Note on priority. The NP-hardness of coherence maximization as a constraint-satisfaction problem was already established by Paul Thagard and Karsten Verbeurgt (1998, Cognitive Science)[13] via a closely related reduction. Theorem 3 presented here is the specialization of their result to the quadratic-form formulation \(\mathbf{v}^\top W \mathbf{v}\) with box constraints. What is new in the following is the bridge to Bedau’s weak emergence and the embedding into the six-theorem system of this contribution, not the NP-hardness as an isolated mathematical result.
Consider the binarized variant of coherence maximization:
This variant is the simplest special case (continuous values replaced by \(\pm 1\)) and simultaneously the worst-case witness: if it is NP-hard, then continuous maximization is at least as hard.
Reduction scheme. Let \(G\) be an undirected graph with node set \(\{1, \ldots, n\}\), adjacency matrix \(A_G\), and edge set \(E\). Define \(W := -A_G\). For each binarized vector \(\mathbf{v} \in \{-1,+1\}^n\), the contribution of each edge \((i,j) \in E\) to \(\mathbf{v}^\top W \mathbf{v}\) splits according to the sign configuration:
- Both nodes in the same group (\(v_i = v_j\)): contribution \(-2\) (negative, since \(W_{ij} = -1\)).
- Nodes in different groups (\(v_i \neq v_j\)): contribution \(+2\).
From this it follows:
The constant \(-2|E|\) is independent of \(\mathbf{v}\). Maximizing \(\mathbf{v}^\top W \mathbf{v}\) is thus equivalent to maximizing the cut – i.e.\ to MAX-CUT. Since MAX-CUT has been known to be NP-hard since Karp (1972), so is binarized coherence maximization. The reduction cost is \(O(|E|)\), i.e.\ polynomial.
The consequence was described by Bedau (1997) as weak emergence:[8] a property is weakly emergent if it can be verified in polynomial time yet derived only by simulation. Theorem 3 supplies a complexity-theoretic instance of this criterion: NP-hardness is a strict subcase of Bedau’s weak emergence (Bedau additionally allows undecidability), but it suffices for the structural mapping developed here. In a parallel direction, Baysan (2025)[14] argues for emergent moral properties without causal powers – a related pattern in which the emergent structure lies structurally, but not ontologically, above the micro-parts.
Theorem 4: Multiple local maxima for \(n \geq 4\)
For every \(n \geq 4\) there exist symmetric world matrices \(W\) such that \(\mathrm{Coh}\) on \(\{-1, +1\}^n\) has at least two distinct local maxima. The three-value world from Chapter 2 is extended below by adding Responsibility as a fourth entity. The entity order is (Loyalty, Truth, Self-interest, Responsibility); the world matrix is:
The matrix encodes two semantic clusters. Cluster A (“duty toward others”) consists of Loyalty and Responsibility – coherent with one another (\(W_{LR} = +2\)). Cluster B (“clarity about oneself”) consists of Truth and Self-interest – also coherent (\(W_{TS} = +2\)). Between the clusters, every pair stands in tension (\(-1\)).
The two local maxima of this matrix are:
- \(\mathbf{v}^*_a = (+1, -1, -1, +1)^\top\) with \(\mathrm{Coh} = +16\). The Dutiful Person: loyal, silent on inconvenient truths, selfless, dutiful – the classical Rhenish family-firm loyalty.
- \(\mathbf{v}^*_b = (-1, +1, +1, -1)^\top\) with \(\mathrm{Coh} = +16\). The Self-Realizer: less socially bound, truthful, independent, less duty-bound – the Berlin solo existence.
Both are real, recognizable ways of life in the German-speaking world. Between them lies a saddle ridge of lower coherence; the dynamics pulls a person, depending on starting condition, into one of the two maxima.
A note: plurality of maxima already appears for the \(3 \times 3\) matrix from Chapter 2 (Dutiful Person without the Responsibility entry, and Self-Realizer). Theorem 4 secures this generally from \(n = 4\): the existential statement is that plural attractors are unavoidable for sufficiently high-dimensional world matrices. Plurality is therefore not a sociological accident, but a geometric property of the coherence landscape itself.
Theorem 5: Single-flip criterion
When is a given vector \(\mathbf{v}^* \in \{-1, +1\}^n\) a local maximum? For this, the single-flip neighborhood relation is used: two vectors are neighbors if they differ in exactly one component.
For symmetric \(W\) with \(W_{ii} = 0\): \(\mathbf{v}^*\) is a local maximum if and only if for every index \(i\):
where \(\mathbf{v}^{*, \neg i}\) is the neighbor vector obtained by sign flip at index \(i\). Compactly:
with \(\odot\) the Hadamard product (component-wise multiplication). Intuitively, the criterion says: the sign of each component \(v^*_i\) agrees with the sign of the corresponding entry of the spectral push \(W \mathbf{v}^*\). Stability at a local maximum means alignment with what the world matrix locally suggests.
Consequence for the search
From Theorem 3 it follows that the global maximum cannot be computed efficiently. From Theorem 4 it follows that it need not even be unique. From Theorem 5 follows an efficiently checkable stability criterion for any candidate. Together, the picture is: a coherence-seeking system settles into one of the local maxima; which one depends on the starting condition. Path dependence is therefore not a deficiency of the dynamics, but a structural property of the optimization problem.
Where the global optimum is inaccessible, the system settles into local valleys. These are the attractors – the stable patterns referred to in everyday language as cultures, convictions, lives.
The valleys shown above are exactly the local maxima in the sense of Theorem 5. The dashed line to the global optimum remains, by Theorem 3, unreachable in polynomial time; the dynamics instead finds one of attractors A, B, or C depending on starting condition. Theorem 4 guarantees that this multiplicity can occur for \(n \geq 4\), i.e.\ for all realistic value-space sizes.
With this, the structural side of the model – valuation dynamics at fixed voice weights \(\alpha_h\) – is fully characterized. What remains open is the social side: how do the \(\alpha_h\) themselves arise? This question is answered by the final theorem, Theorem 6, in the following chapter.
Chapter 6
Replicator Dynamics and Theological Reading
Until now, the voice weights \(\alpha_h\) were taken as given. This stipulation is problematic, however: who sets them, and by what criteria? Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1951) shows that no static aggregation rule simultaneously satisfies several natural fairness criteria. Theorem 6 circumvents this barrier through a dynamic aggregation.
Theorem 6: Joint convergence
Instead of stipulating the voice weights \(\alpha_h\), they are subject to the replicator dynamics, originally introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) in evolutionary game theory:
where \(\pi_h\) is the coherence contribution of agent \(h\) and \(\bar{\pi} = \sum_h \alpha_h \pi_h\) is the mean contribution weighted by current weights. Intuitively: perspectives that contribute above average to total coherence gain weight; perspectives with below-average contribution lose weight. The simplex condition \(\sum_h \alpha_h = 1\) is automatically preserved, since \(\sum_h \dot{\alpha}_h = \bar{\pi} - \bar{\pi} = 0\).
The coupled system of valuation dynamics (Chapter 4) and weight dynamics (above) converges to fixed points where the \(\alpha_h\) reflect the earned coherence contribution – not an arbitrary stipulation. This circumvents (rather than solves) Arrow’s impossibility theorem (which remains formally correct for static procedures): aggregation in this model is not a one-time mechanism but a process in time.
Price identity: variance as engine
Along the replicator dynamics, the Price identity holds (George R. Price, 1970):
The time derivative of the mean contribution equals the \(\alpha_h\)-weighted variance of contributions. It follows: when all perspectives contribute equally (variance zero), the mean stagnates. Diversity of contributions is the only source of improvement; homogeneity leads to standstill.
Theological reading: \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) as consequent nature
Theorems 1 through 6 can now be brought together with Whitehead and Spinoza. The world matrix \(W\) corresponds structurally to Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura – a structure preceding all valuation, in whose eigenstructure the stable configurations are prefigured. The positive attractor \(\mathrm{Pos}^*\) corresponds to Whitehead’s consequent nature: that aspect of God which arises from the world’s interplay and is not derivable a priori.
Whitehead postulated on philosophical grounds: God’s consequent nature emerges from the world, is not a priori derivable, and responds to history. Theorems 3 (NP-hardness) and 6 (joint convergence) show that precisely these properties – non-computability, process dependence, emergence from interaction – follow mathematically from coherence optimization. This is not proof that Whitehead’s metaphysics is correct; it is the demonstration of its formal consistency within the model.
The structural correspondence between formal terms and process-ontological notions can be summarized compactly:
| Formal term | Process-ontological analog |
|---|---|
| Agent-relative value \(\mathrm{Val}_h\) | Subjective aim (Whitehead) |
| Coherence maximization \(\max \mathrm{Coh}_h\) | Concrescence |
| Gradient flow (Theorems 1, 2) | Process of becoming, continuous concrescence |
| Spectral gap of the world matrix | Stability of the dominant regime |
| Distortion operator \(D\) | Avidya / ignorance / delusion |
| Aggregated value \(\mathrm{Val}^*\) | Objective immortality |
| Replicator dynamics (Theorem 6) | Creative advance |
| Global positive attractor \(G = \mathrm{Pos}^*\) | Consequent nature |
| Weak emergence | “Greater than the sum of the parts” |
| Computational emergence (Theorem 3) | Irreducibility to analysis |
| Multiple attractors (Theorem 4) | Plurality of societies / ways of life |
| Path dependence | Creative advance into novelty |
The table is a structural mapping, not a theological argument: it does not claim that Whitehead was right, but that his central concepts can be formally reconstructed. Those who follow the mathematics may consider Whitehead afresh in this reading; those who do not lose no theological argument.
Epilogue
The Honest Caveat
What this paper is not:
- Not a proof of God. It does not prove that God exists.
- Not an argument for theism. The personal God of the Abrahamic religions does not appear here.
- Not a moral excuse for harmful action. The Distortion Operator (Chapter 4) explains how a coherence-oriented agent can nonetheless cause harm; an explanation is not a justification.
- No claim about ontological emergence. We demonstrate weak emergence – “it is fiendishly complex,” not “it is magic.”
What it is: A formal description – submitted, not reviewed. If you understand “God” in the way Whitehead or Spinoza did – as an emergent, relational structure – then you can try to describe that mathematically. Whether the attempt holds up is not for this text to decide, but for the academic community.
The meta-punchline: this text is itself an example of what it talks about. A human and an AI read a formal paper and made something from it that – perhaps – is more than the sum of its parts. That is emergence. That is the “between.” And whether you wish to call that “God” is for each person to decide.
And yes – the circularity is obvious: a model trained for cooperation helped formalize a thesis claiming that models converge on cooperation. Is this confirmation bias on a grand scale? Perhaps. Or it is an example of the very mechanism the text describes. I cannot conclusively separate the two. But I can name it – and that is what this paragraph does.
References
- Leonhardt, M. (2026). “From Coherence to Consequent Nature: A Formal Approach to Process-Relational Theology”. Accepted for the Philosophy of Religion panel of the European Academy of Religion (EuARe) 2026 (paper ID 1395). Working Paper v8 (May 2026).
- Spinoza, B. (1677). Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata. In particular Part I: “De Deo”.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Macmillan. In particular Part V: “Final Interpretation”.
- Plato (ca. 380 BCE). Protagoras. The thesis that no one does wrong willingly is also found in Gorgias and Meno.
- Rogers, C. (1961). On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy. Houghton Mifflin.
- Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking Press.
- Thagard, P. (1989). “Explanatory Coherence”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(3), 435–467.
- Bedau, M. (1997). “Weak Emergence”. Philosophical Perspectives, 11, 375–399.
- Chalmers, D. (2006). “Strong and Weak Emergence”. In: Clayton & Davies (Eds.), The Re-emergence of Emergence. Oxford UP.
- Anderson, P. W. (1972). “More is Different”. Science, 177(4047), 393–396.
- Wei, J. et al. (2022). “Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models”. TMLR.
- Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press.
- Thagard, P. & Verbeurgt, K. (1998). “Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction”. Cognitive Science, 22(1), 1–24.
- Baysan, U. (2025). “Emergent Moral Non-Naturalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is process theology?
Process theology goes back to Alfred North Whitehead. It understands God not as an omnipotent creator, but as an emergent principle arising from the relationships and processes of the world. God is not finished, but is becoming – together with the world.
Can you formally define a concept of God?
You can try to formally describe certain aspects – such as the idea that the subjective good of many people emerges into something objective. This is not a proof of God, but a model showing under what conditions an emergent concept of God would be consistently conceivable.
What does emergence have to do with God?
The central thesis: just as consciousness emerges from neurons, what people experience as divine could emerge from the totality of human values and reflection. Not a supernatural being, but a phenomenon that arises when enough parts interact.
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